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ONE SHOULD NOT PAY FOR ALL--DRUG
QUANTITY TRIGGERING MANDATORY
MINIMUMS SHOULD BE INDIVIDUALIZED IN
CONSPIRACY SENTENCING
"It is unconstitutionalfor a legislature to remove from the jury the

assessment offacts that increase the prescribedrange ofpenalties to which
a criminal defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that suchfacts must be
establishedby proof beyond a reasonable doubt. "' In the considerationof
conspiracy drug offenses, the circuits have not yet come to a consensus as

to whether an individualizedor conspiracy-wide theory should be used to
determine the quantity of drugsfor each defendant requiredto triggera
mandatory minimum sentencing requirement.2

I. INTRODUCTION
In the current political climate, harsh sentencing requirements for
drug offenses is a fiercely-contested issue between dueling political parties.'
' See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (quoting Jones v. United States, 526
U.S. 227, 252-53 (1999) (Stevens, J., concurring)) (emphasizing constitutional requirement of
proving defendant guilty beyond reasonable doubt).
2 See United States v. Stoddard, 892 F.3d 1203, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 2018) ("The question remains
'whether it is the individualizeddrug quantity that is a fact that increases the mandatory minimum
sentence."' (quoting United States v. Pizarro, 772 F.3d 284, 292 (1st Cir. 2014)).
3 See Editorial, Sessions' Wrong Call on Nonviolent Drug Offenders, CHI. TRIB. (May 24,
2017, 5:47 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/editorials/ct-sessions-mandatoryminimum-sentences-edit-0525-md-20170524-story.htm [https://perma.cc/ZM72-9XNU] (stating
disproportional effect of tough-on-drug-crime policies on minorities); see also Matt Ford, Jeff
Sessions Reinvigorates the Drug War, ATLANTIc (May 12, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com
/politics/archive/2017/05/sessions-sentencing-memo/52602 9 /
[https://perma.cc/HU2V-RS46]
(criticizing Sessions's appeal to prosecutors to seek maximum punishment lawfully possible). "'In
some cases, mandatory-minimum and recidivist-enhancement statutes have resulted in unduly
harsh sentences and perceived or actual disparities that do not reflect our Principles of Federal
Prosecution .... Long sentences for low-level, non-violent drug offenses do not promote public
safety, deterrence, and rehabilitation."' Ford, supra note 3 (quoting memo from previous Attorney
General Eric Holder); Jennifer Hansler, Trump Set One Woman Free,But He's Trying to Put a Lot
More Drug Offenders Away, CNN (June 7, 2018, 12:53 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018
/06/07/politics/trump-alice-johnson-drug-policies/index.html
[https://perma.cc/XBE4-NM95]
(contrasting Trump's general demonization of drug offenders with specific generosity toward Alice
Marie Johnson); but see Josh Gerstein, Sessions Moves to Lengthen Drug Sentences, POLITICO
(May 12, 2017, 6:24 AM), https://www.politico.com/ story/ 2017/05/12/mandatory-minimumdrug-sentences-jeff-sessions-238295
[https://perma.cc/7A52-K96L]
(explaining
Session's
concession that the opioid crisis "won't be solved solely by putting more people in prison but...
tougher law enforcement is an essential part of the solution."). "While the new policy does instruct
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Proponents argue that the benefit of lenient sentencing for nonviolent drug
offenders is a lower rate of incarceration with fewer devastating effects on
communities of color where longer sentences do not really deter crime to
begin with.4 Meanwhile, advocates of the maximum punishment strategy
contend that directing federal prosecutors to "charge and pursue the most
serious, readily provable offense in felony cases" fulfills the government's
vital responsibility of keeping communities safe and protecting American
citizens from corruption and harm.5
Title 21 of the United States Code, section 841, which prescribes
mandatory minimum sentencing requirements for defendants convicted of
trafficking over a certain quantity of illegal drugs, is likely one of the most
controversial provisions in the federal judicial system.6 Often times, the

prosecutors to generally pursue the most serious provable drug charge, it does allow for exceptions
based on 'good judgment."' Gerstein, supra note 3; see also Alfred S. Regnery, Longer Prison
Sentences: Good for the Crime Rate, Bad for the Criminal, FOX NEWS (May 27, 2017),
https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/longer-prison-sentences-good-for-the-crime-rate-bad-for-thecriminal [https://perma.cc/Z8ED-THKL] (opining Sessions's memo restores law to original
intentions of Congress).
4 See Steven N. Durlauf & Daniel S. Nagin, Imprisonmentand Crime: Can Both Be Reduced?,
10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 13, 14 (2011) (opining that increasing already lengthy prison
sentences does not effectively fight crime); see also Editorial, supra note 3 (arguing harsh
sentencing for nonviolent offenders does not produce effective results). Money put toward
"housing a [prison] population that is nearly half drug offenders" could be better used to "beef[] up
drug use treatment programs." Editorial, supranote 3.
5 See Regnery, supra note 3 (asserting drug traffickers tend to be career criminals dangerous
to community).
When an arrest is made of a pusher lower on the totem pole, prosecutors will use the
threat of a severe sentence as a bargaining chip to work up the chain to nab the kingpin
and those just under him. Charging one of the lowly ones with a fifteen year mandatory
minimum can be a very effective way of getting the fellow to rat on his colleagues in
return for a deal on the sentence.
Id; Toby Helm & Jamie Doward, Longer Prison Terms Really Do Cut Crime, Study Shows,
GUARDIAN (July 7, 2012, 2:45 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/law/2012/jul/O7/longer-prisonsentences-cut-crime [https://perma.cc/6586-YMV4] (finding long sentences particularly effective
when targeted at serious repeat offenders).
6 See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (listing drug quantities to corresponding required penalties). For
example, a person who was convicted of trafficking five kilograms or more of cocaine would have
a mandatory minimum sentence of the following:
[M]ay not be less than 10 years or more than life and if death or serious bodily injury
results from the use of such substance shall be not less than 20 years or more than life, a
fine not to exceed the greater of that authorized in accordance with the provisions of
Title 18 or $10,000,000 if the defendant is an individual or $50,000,000 if the defendant
is other than an individual, or both.
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crime that a defendant commits does not truly warrant the severe punishment
that he or she is prescribed.7 Cynthia Powell, a first-time offender, sold
$300.00 worth of hydrocodone pills to an undercover police officer, for
which she is serving a twenty-five year mandatory minimum sentence in
Florida state prison.8
At age 17, she dropped out of high school and gave birth to
a daughter, Jackie .... [whose] father left when [she] was
only a month or two old. On disability because of
uncontrollable diabetes, Cynthia focused her life on raising
her daughter and helping out with other family members'
kids .... Jackie had a premature daughter .... When she
was released from the hospital after five months... Cynthia
took on a major part of the responsibility of raising her. Over
the years, Cynthia's diabetes worsened, and she began
taking the prescription medication Lorcet, which contains
hydrocodone, for severe pain in her legs ....
An
acquaintance of hers was working as a confidential
informant[] for the police, and called Cynthia. She had the
flu, she said, and she'd heard that Cynthia had a prescription
for Lorcet. Cynthia refused, but the CI kept calling.
Eventually .... [s]he sold 35 hydrocodone tablets and
Soma tablets .... The Lorcet pills containing hydrocodone
weighed 29.3 grams, just 1.3 grams above the weight
necessary to trigger a 25-year mandatory minimum
sentence .... The judge [said to her at sentencing], 'I'm
sorry, Ms. Powell, there's nothing else I can do. It's not an
Id. § 841(b)(1)(A). See David Bjerk, Mandatory Minimums and the Sentencing of FederalDrug
Crimes, 46 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 93-94 (2017) (detailing controversial nature of mandatory
minimum requirement).
This law is prominent and controversial for several reasons. First, it potentially applies
to a very large population of defendants. Indeed, in fiscal year 2010, drug offenses made
up almost 30 percent of all federal offenses (second only to immigration offenses), with
almost 25,000 offenders convicted of a federal drug offense .... Second, the mandatory
minimums can be quite long.., even for nonviolent first-time offenders.

Id.
7 See Bjerk, supra note 6, at 94 (acknowledging disparity amongst different types of drugs in
sentencing requirements); CynthiaPowell: 25 Years for 35 Pills, FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY
MINIMUMS, https://famm.org/stories/cynthia-powell-25-years-35-pills-2/ (last visited Dec. 16,
2019) [https://perma.cc/FE8U-XWJD] (demonstrating devastating effects of mandatory minimum
sentence on nonviolent offender).
8 See Cynthia Powell: 25 Years for 35 Pills, supra note 7 (describing Cynthia's reasons for
selling prescription diabetes medication).
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easy thing, but I can't do anything else.' The mandatory
minimum stripped [the judge] of all discretion. 9
The accused has a constitutional right to require the prosecutor to
prove every element of the charged offense to the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.1 The utilization of aggressive prosecutorial methods regarding
mandatory minimums has sparked a debate amongst the circuits over the
constitutionality of sentencing a defendant based on the quantity of drugs
recovered from the entire conspiracy that he or she was involved in.11 Since
the Supreme Court held in Alleyne v. United States12 that the constitutional
right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt applies to facts triggering
mandatory minimum sentences, there has been a shift in the circuits from the
requirement that the prosecutor show conspiracy-wide drug quantity in order
to invoke mandatory minimum sentences for all defendants involved to a
defendant-specific burden of proof regarding the drug quantity.13 In a post-

' See id. (demonstrating problematic nature of mandatory minimums where judge has no
discretion in sentencing).
10 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (describing rights in criminal proceedings).
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartialjury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have

the Assistance of Counsel for his defence [sic].
Id. (emphasis added); see Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000) ("'[U]nder... the
notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact other than prior conviction[] that
increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury,
and proven beyond a reasonable doubt."' (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243, n.6
(1999))).
ll See United States v. Stoddard, 892 F.3d 1203, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (recognizing circuit
split on issue). The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held, "'a defendant convicted of conspiracy to
deal drugs, in violation of § 846, must be sentenced, under § 841(b), for the quantity of drugs the
jury attributes to him as a reasonablyforeseeablepart of the conspiracy."' Id. at 1221 (quoting
United States v. Law, 528 F.3d 888, 906 (D.C. Cir. 2008)); but see United States v. Phillips, 349
F.3d 138, 142-43 (3d Cir. 2003), vacated on othergrounds by Barbour v. United States, 543 U.S.
1102 (2005) ("In drug conspiracy cases, Apprendi requires the jury to find only the drug type and
quantity element as to the conspiracy as a whole, and not the drug type and quantity attributable to
each co-conspirator."). "Once the jury makes these findings, it is for the sentencing judge to
determine by a preponderance of the evidence the drug quantity attributable to each defendant ......
Phillips,349 F.3d at 143.
12 570 U.S. 99 (2013).
13 See Stoddard, 892 F.3d at 1220 (recognizing shift in two circuits from initially adopting
conspiracy-wide approach to individualized approach); see also United States v. Gibson, No. 156122, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 21141 at *2-3 (6th Cir. Nov. 21, 2016), vacated, 854 F.3d 367 (6th
Cir. 2017) (applying individualized approach); but see United States v. Gibson, 874 F.3d 544, 544
(6th Cir. 2017) (reinstating district court's sentence based on conspiracy-wide approach); see also
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Alleyne world, it is likely unconstitutional to sentence a defendant in
compliance with a mandatory minimum requirement if the quantity of drugs
has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt attributable to him as an
individual, deterring exposure to jail time for an unforeseen quantity of
drugs.

14

II. HISTORY OF U.S. DRUG POLICY AND APPLICATION OF
APPRENDI AND ALLEYNE
Drug policy has had a profound effect on the United States criminal
justice system over the last forty years, largely emerging from President
Nixon's declaration that drug abuse is "America's public enemy number
one."15 In October of 1982, Ronald Reagan addressed the nation during a
radio broadcast and announced his intent to crack down on drug
prosecutions, "We're making no excuses for drugs-hard, soft, or otherwise.
United States v. Stiger, 413 F.3d 1185, 1193 (10th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that "[a] jury is not
required to make individualized findings as to each coconspirator [sic] because 'the sentencing
judge's findings do not.., have the effect of increasing an individual defendant's exposure beyond
the statutory maximum justified by the jury's guilty verdict."' (citation omitted)). Stiger, however,
was overturned 12 years later. See United States v. Ellis, 868 F.3d 1155, 1176 (10th Cir. 2017).
"[A] defendant can be held 'accountable for that drug quantity which was within the scope of the
agreement and reasonably foreseeable' to him." Id. at 1170 (quoting United States v. Dewberry,
790 F.3d 1022, 1030 (10th Cir. 2015)).
14 See Dewberry, 790 F.3d at 1030 (holding defendant "can be held accountable for that drug
quantity which was within the scope of agreement and reasonably foreseeable to him" (citation
omitted)). In order to highlight the impact of the amount of drugs on sentencing, the court
highlighted, "[i]f he had been found instead to have distributed only 28 grams or more and less than
280 grams of crack, with his prior conviction, he would have been subject to a 10-year mandatory
minimum," as opposed to the 20-year mandatory minimum he received for distribution of 280
grams or more. Id.at 1029; see Stoddard,892 F.3d at 1221 (stating that .'reasonable foreseeability'
shapes the outer bounds of co-conspirator liability, and it applies to drug quantities that trigger
enhanced penalties, just the same as it applies to other acts committed by co-conspirators."); United
States v. Rangel, 781 F.3d 736, 742-43 (4th Cir. 2015) (stating sentencing requirement
unconstitutional where court "'effectively attributed to [the defendant], an individual member of
the conspiracy, the quantity of cocaine base distributed by the entire conspiracy. "' (quoting United
States v. Collins, 415 F.3d 304, 314 (4th Cir. 2005))).
15

See Don Stemen, Beyond the War: The Evolving Nature of the US. Approach to Drugs, 11

HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 375, 375 (2017) (citing Richard Nixon, President of the United States,
Remarks About an Intensified Program for Drug Abuse Prevention and Control at the white House
Briefing Room (June 17, 1971) (transcript available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
documents/remarks-about-intensified-program-for-drug-abuse-prevention-and-control)
[https://perma.cc/HSZ6-XQWA]) (delineating emerging "concerns about the manufacture,
distribution, and possession of drugs .... "). "President Reagan's subsequent pronouncement of
drugs as 'an especially vicious virus of crime' set a course for national drug policy that emphasized
enforcement and punishment over treatment to 'win the war on drugs. "' Id. (citing Ronald Reagan,
President of the United States, Radio Address to the Nation on Federal Drug Policy at Camp David
(Oct. 2, 1982) (transcript available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/radio-addressthe-nation-federal-drug-policy), available at [https://perma.cc/DS9U-ZXAG]).
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Drugs are bad, and we're going after them... we've taken down the
surrender flag and run up the battle flag.., we're going to win the war on
drugs."16 Towards the mid-1990s, the perception of drugs in the United
States began to shift in the direction of a more rehabilitation-friendly
approach, leading to the expansion of drug courts, treatment programs, and
alternative sentencing policies for drug offenders. 7
Both President Bush and Obama forged forward in the effort toward
rehabilitating drug offenders-Bush pushing for increased funding for
substance abuse treatment, and Obama declaring the war on drugs an "utter
failure," reducing sentences for all drug offenses under the sentencing
guidelines of the federal government.18 Obama-era Attorney General Eric
Holder asserted that prosecutors should decline to charge the quantity
necessary to trigger mandatory minimums if a defendant's relevant conduct
does not involve the use or threat of violence, the possession of a weapon,
the trafficking of drugs to minors, or death or serious bodily injury, the

16 See Reagan, supra note 15 (depicting President Reagan's optimism regarding crack down

on drugs); see also Stemen, supra note 15, at 375 (explaining how Reagan's drug policy led to
adoption of new mandatory sentences and sentence enhancements).
17 See Stemen, supra note 15, at 376 (exhibiting ways jurisdictions sought "to divert drug
offenders from prison and to develop community- and prison-based treatment programs for drug
users."); see also Office of Justice Programs, Looking at a Decade of Drug Courts, DRUG CT.
CLEARINGHOUSE AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (June 1999), https://www.ncjrs.
gov/html/bja/decade98.htm [https://perma.cc/EP4S-NZZ2] (analyzing shift to drug court to curb
recidivism rates).
18 See Stemen, supra note 15, at 377 (articulating continuation of shift towards rehabilitation
under Bush and Obama); see also WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY, 20
(March 2004) ("[Drug offenders] have an immediate need, and we have launched a new program
to address it-Access to Recovery. Begun in. . . 2004, with an additional $100 million requested
in fiscal year 2005, the program will expand access to clinical substance abuse treatment .... ");
Bemd Debusmann, Obama and the Failed War on Drugs, REUTERS (Apr. 16, 2012, 1:55 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-column-debusmann-drugs/obama-and-the-failed-war-ondrugs-bemd-debusmann-idUSBRE83FOZR20120416
[https://perma.cc/5577-V5HD]
(quoting
Obama from 2004 debate at Northwestern University); Sensible Sentencing Reform: The 2014
Reduction of Drug Sentences, U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, at 1-2, available at https://www.ussc.gov
/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/backgrounders/profile_2014_drugamendment
.pdf [https://perma.cc/WT43-A89N] ("Congress set up the 'safety valve,' which allows low-level
drug offenders who cooperate to be sentenced below the mandatory minimum... provid[ing] much
greater incentive to plead."); Eric H. Holder, Attorney General, Department Policy on Charging
Mandatory Minimum Sentences and Recidivist Enhancements in Certain Drug Cases, 30 FED.
SENT'G REP. 12, 12 (Oct. 1, 2017) (emphasizing need to "ensure that our most severe mandatory
minimum penalties are reserved for serious, high-level, or violent drug traffickers."). "Long
sentences for low-level, non-violent drug offenses do not promote public safety, deterrence, and
rehabilitation." Holder, supranote 18; but see Tim Dickinson, Why America Can 't Quit the Drug
War, ROLLING STONE (May 5, 2016, 4:07 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culturenews/why-america-cant-quit-the-drug-war-47203/
[https://perma.cc/AU87-ML44]
("Despite
strides toward a more sane national drug policy, the deeper infrastructure of the War on Drugs
remains fundamentally unaltered under Obama.").
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defendant is not a supervisor of others within a criminal organization, tied to
a large-scale organization, and the defendant does not have a significant
criminal history.19 Trump's presidency has brought about a sharp turn away

ever-growing pattern of distancing the country from the war on
from the
20

drugs.

[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth
Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that
increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged
to a jury, and proven beyond a
in an indictment, 2submitted
1
reasonable doubt.
Title 2 1, § 841 of the United States Code sets out the illegality of the
manufacturing and distribution of controlled substances and specifies the
mandatory minimum and maximum penalties associated with particular
quantities of controlled substances.2 2 The prosecutor may also charge a drug
offender with conspiracy to commit those offenses, and subject them to the
same penalties as if they had committed the offense that was the "object of
the attempt or conspiracy., 23 In order to sentence a defendant to a penalty

19 See Holder, supra note 18, at 13 (incentivizing lenient sentence proposals for federal
prosecutors).
20 See Ford, supra note 3 ("It is a core principle that prosecutors should charge and pursue the
most serious, readily provable offense. .. . By definition, the most serious offenses are those that
carry the most substantial guidelines sentence, including mandatory-minimum sentences.").
21 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000) (quoting Jones v. United States, 526
U.S. 227, 243, n.6 (1999)).

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on
a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury... nor shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law ....
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
22

See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2018) ("Except as authorized by this title, it shall be unlawful for

any person knowingly or intentionally ...to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with
intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; or... a counterfeit
substance."); Id. § 841(b) (proscribing sentencing requirements for particularized quantities of
controlled substances).
23 Id. § 846 (dictating penalties for conspiracy to manufacture or distribute controlled
substances). "Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this title
shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which
was the object of the attempt or conspiracy." Id.
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reflecting the controlled substance's weight, the quantity of that substance
must be presented to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.24
If a defendant faces punishment beyond that provided by
statute when an offense is committed under certain
circumstances but not others, it is obvious that both the loss
of liberty and the stigma attaching to the offense are
heightened; it necessarily follows that the defendant should
not-at the moment the [government] is put to proof of
those circumstances-be deprived of the protections that
have, until that point, unquestionably attached.
In Alleyne v. UnitedStates, the United States Supreme Court applied
the Apprendi ruling to factors triggering a mandatory minimum sentence,
holding that any fact "[e]levating the low end of a sentencing range heightens
the loss of liberty associated with the crime" and therefore must be proven
to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 26 The Court concluded that including
every fact that was a basis for imposing or increasing punishment in the
24 See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476-77 (emphasizing constitutional importance of proving all

elements of crime to jury beyond reasonable doubt).
At stake... are constitutional protections of surpassing importance: the proscription of
any deprivation of liberty without "due process of law," and the guarantee that "in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury,".... Taken together, these rights indisputably entitle a criminal
defendant to "a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the crime with
which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt."
Id. (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995)); see 2 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CHECKLISTS 6TH AMEND. § 7:16 (2018) ("The judge] can do no more, consistent with the Sixth
Amendment, than determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of.")
(citing Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2252 (2016)); Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein,
Acceptance ofResponsibility and Conspiracy Sentences in Drug ProsecutionsAfter Apprendi, 14
FED. SENT'G R. 165 (2002) (discussing impact of Apprendi on drug prosecution). Before Apprendi,
where the defendant decided to plead guilty but could not come to an agreement with the
government as to the amount of drugs that would establish his offense level under the guidelines,

both parties would enter into the agreement without quantifying the amount and leave that
determination to the judge at sentencing. King, supra note 24. After Apprendi, "a plea agreement
that does not specify drug quantity, now an element of each greater offense, will support only a
sentence within the statutory maximum of the lesser offense, even if the greater drug amount is
later established at sentencing." Id.
25 See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484 (noting that there should be heightened protections for
defendants who face sentence greater than statute).
26 See Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 113 (2013) (declaring that any fact increasing
sentencing floor is essential ingredient of offense); see also 1 J. BISHOP, LAW OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 80, 51 (2d ed. 1872) (defining crime). "Crime" consists of every fact which "is in
law essential to the punishment sought to be inflicted..." or the whole of the wrong "to which the
law affixes... punishment." Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 109 (citing BISHOP at 51).
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indictment was a well-established practice supported by widely recognized
principles.2" In the 5-4 decision by the Court, Justice Thomas extended

Apprendi's requirement of proof to facts increasing the mandatory minimum
of the offense, recognizing that the elevation of the low end of a sentencing
range heightens the potential for loss of liberty:
Just as the maximum of life marks the outer boundary of the
range, so seven years marks its floor. And because the
legally prescribed range is the penalty affixed to the crime,
it follows that a fact increasing either end of the range
produces a new penalty and constitutes an ingredient of the
offense.2 8
As mandatory minimum sentences have the potential to vastly
increase exposure to harsher verdicts and longer prison time, defendants
charged with conspiracy to commit a drug violation face potentially daunting
punishments if they are sentenced pursuant to the drug quantity attributed to
the conspiracy as a whole.29 Shortly after Apprendi was decided, courts were
27 See Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 110 (recognizing historical emphasis on proof of all elements
contributing to punishment); see also United States v. Fisher, 25 F.Cas. 1086, 1086 (C.C. Ohio
1849) ("A [mail carrier] is subject to a higher penalty where he steals a letter out of the mail, which
contains an article of value... the indictment must allege the letter contained an article of value,
which aggravates the offense and incurs a higher penalty."); Hope v. Commonwealth, 50 Mass.
134, 137 (1845) (holding value of stolen property in larceny case to be element of offense).
Our statutes, it will be remembered, prescribe the punishment for larceny, with reference
to the value of the property stolen; and for this reason, as well as because it is in
conformity with long established practice, the court are of [the] opinion that the value of
the property alleged to be stolen must be set forth in the indictment.
Hope, 50 Mass. at 137; see Ritchey v. State, 7 Blackf. 168, 169 (Ind. 1844) (declaring indictment
must allege value of destroyed property under arson statute); J. ARCHBOLD, PLEADING &
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 51 (15th ed. 1862) ("Where a statute annexes a higher degree of
punishment to a common-law felony, if committed under particular circumstances, an indictment
for the offence, in order to bring the defendant within that higher degree of punishment, must
expressly charge it to have been committed under those circumstances, and must state the
circumstances with certainty and precision.").
28 See Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 112 (emphasizing Court's decision is supported by common sense).
"It is impossible to dissociate the floor of a sentencing range from the penalty affixed to the
crime ....Indeed, criminal statutes have long specified both the floor and ceiling of sentence
ranges, which is evidence that both define the legally prescribed penalty." Id.; Apprendi, 530 U.S.,
at 478-79 (requiring that facts increasing mandatory minimums be defined so defendants may
predict applicable penalty).
29 See United States v. Stoddard, 892 F.3d 1203, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (recognizing
defendants' exposure to significantly higher sentence attributed to conspiracy's drug quantity not
individualized quantity); Hansler, supra note 3 (emphasizing harsh sentences resulting from
mandatory minimums). "[T]hose convicted in the 2016 fiscal year of crimes carrying mandatory
minimum penalties received an average of 110 months-approximately 9 years-in prison. That
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permitted to convict each individual conspirator for agreeing to participate
in a drug conspiracy of a specified type and amount without proof that they
reasonably should have foreseen the amount or type of all drugs involved.3 °
Since the Alleyne decision, however, all of the circuits that have explicitly
addressed the issue determined that there must be an individualized jury
finding as to the quantity and type of drugs attributable to each individual
conspirator in order to trigger a mandatory minimum sentence. 3'
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Although it is without dispute amongst the circuits that a drug
quantity must be proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, there is a
disagreement surrounding the constitutional implications of sentencing a coconspirator based on the conspiracy's total drug quantity.32 Under both
Apprendi and Alleyne, each subsection of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) is a separate
crime prescribed with its own drug quantity and sentencing range.33 The

was four times the average sentence-a bit over 2 years-for those convicted of a crime without
the mandatory minimum." Hansler, supra note 3.
30 See King and Klein, supra note 24 (examining state of drug conspiracy sentencing after
Apprendi). "[P]resently courts do not demand that the jury determine that each individual
conspirator agree that the conspiracy involve the possession with intent to deliver the type and
amount of drugs involved in the conspiracy itself." 1d; see United States v. Knight, 342 F.3d 697,
710 (7th Cir. 2003) ("Apprendi... does not require defendant-specific findings of drug type and
quantity in drug-conspiracy cases."); United States v. Fields, 251 F.3d 1041, 1043-1044 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (stating individualized knowledge of drug quantity not necessary to prove to jury); United
States v. Promise, 255 F.3d 150, 157 n.6 (4th Cir. 2001) (deciding that "the task of identifying the
amount of drugs for which the defendant should be held accountable ... is left to the district
court."); United States v. Sanchez, 269 F.3d 1250, 1266 n.28 (11th Cir. 2001) (recognizing
knowledge of amount of drugs in conspiracy not element of offense under 18 U.S.C. § 841).
31 See Stoddard, 892 F.3d at 1220 ("The circuits that earlier adopted the conspiracy-wide
approach have, at times, failed to grapple with it in subsequent published and unpublished cases
decided after Alleyne."). "It is a core principle of conspiratorial liability that a co-conspirator may
be held liable for acts committed by co-conspirators during the course of the conspiracy only when
those acts are 'in furtherance of the conspiracy' and 'reasonably foreseeable' to the defendant." Id.
at 1221 (citing Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1946)).
32 See id.at 1220 (quoting United States v. Pizarro, 772 F.3d 284, 292 (1st Cir. 2014))
(recognizing split amongst circuits in answering "whether it is the individualizeddrug quantity that
is a fact that increases the mandatory minimum sentence."). "The question remains ... whether,
as the District Court found, the amount of drugs attributable to the conspiracy as a whole can be
the fact which triggers the mandatory minimum for an individual defendant." Id.
13 See Pizarro,772 F.3d at 292 (stating Supreme Court held each subsection is separate crime).
Citing Alleyne and Apprendi, the Supreme Court in Burrage v. United States, 134 S.Ct.
881 (2014), explained that because an aggravating element in § 841 (b)(1)... "increased
the minimum and maximum sentences to which the defendant was exposed, it is an
element that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt."...
Just as the "death results" element [addressed in Burrage]makes the distribution of drugs
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majority of circuits have adopted the individualized approach, while a small
number of courts still have not explicitly rejected the conspiracy-wide
approach.34
The D.C., First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits all embrace the
individualized approach.3 5 These circuits have universally determined that
the drug quantity triggering an individual's mandatory minimum sentence
must have been foreseeable to him.36 In particular, long before Apprendi and
Alleyne were decided, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits held steadfast to the rule
that a particular defendant must have a connection with the quantity of drugs
that would trigger his penalty for conspiracy to distribute.37 The courts in
where death results a separate crime ...without a death resulting, drug quantity in §
841 (b)(1) creates aggravated conspiracy and possession offenses.
-d. (citations omitted).
14 See Stoddard, 892 F.3d at 1220 ("The circuits that earlier adopted the conspiracy-wide
approach have, at times, failed to grapple with it in subsequent published and unpublished cases
decided after Alleyne.").
" See id. at 1221 ("We adopt the individualized approach to drug-quantity determinations that
trigger an individual defendant's mandatory minimum sentence."); Pizarro, 772 F.3d at 293-94
(conforming to individualized sentencing method).
[F]or a [drug] conspiracy conviction.., the jury must now find that the defendant (1)
conspired, (2) knowingly or intentionally to distribute [a controlled substance], (3) in a
conspiracy that involved a total of [a certain quantity of that controlled substance]... (4)
where at least [that same quantity was] foreseeable to the defendant.
Pizarro, 772 F.3d at 293-94 (citations omitted); United States v. Rangel, 781 F.3d 736, 744 (4th
Cir. 2015) (applying individualized principle that "district court... [must find defendant himself]
responsible" for quantity); United States v. Haines, 803 F.3d 713, 739 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that
defendants' mandatory minimum was improperly determined). "[Defendants] should have been
sentenced based on the drug quantity attributable to them as individuals, not the quantity
attributable to the entire conspiracy." Haines, 803 F.3d at 739. See United States v. Banuelos, 322
F.3d 700, 704 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing and remanding case where district court sentenced
defendant based on conspiracy as whole). "In sentencing a defendant convicted of conspiracy to
distribute a controlled substance, a district court may not automatically count as relevant conduct
the entire quantity of drugs distributed by the conspiracy." Id. (citing United States v. GarciaSanchez, 189 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 1999)).
36 See Haines, 803 F.3d at 740 (highlighting reasonable foreseeability requirement). "[Flor a
sentencing court to attribute to a defendant a certain quantity of drugs, the court must make two
separate findings: (1) the quantity of the drugs in the entire operation and (2) the amount which
each defendant knew or should have known was involved in the conspiracy." Id. (quoting United
States v. Quiroz-Hernandez, 48 F.3d 858, 870 (5th Cir. 1995)); Banuelos, 322 F.3d at 704
(explaining requirements to sentence defendant on drug conspiracy charge). "[T]he court must find
the quantity of drugs that either (1) fell within the scope of the defendant's agreement with his
coconspirators [sic] or (2) was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant." Banuelos, 322 F.3d at
704.
37 See Haines, 803 F.3d at 740 ("For purposes of... determining statutory minimum and
maximum sentences, our cases always have limited the defendant's liability to the quantity of drugs
with which he was directly involved or that was reasonably foreseeable to him."); Banuelos, 322
F.3d at 704 (chronicling Ninth Circuit's well-settled application of individualized method to
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this majority have wholly rejected the government's oft-contended argument
that reasonable foreseeability flows automatically from membership in a
conspiracy.38
Originally, the Third and Seventh Circuits followed the conspiracywide approach.39 For these circuits, the courts specified that the jury must
determine beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the existence of a conspiracy, (2)
the defendant's involvement in it, and (3) the requisite drug type and quantity
involved in the conspiracy as a whole.4" Several cases in both the Third and
Seventh Circuits, however, have called into question whether the conspiracywide position is still being followed, but they have yet to concretely reject
it.4 Although these circuits have not explicitly rejected the conspiracy-wide

sentencing). The Ninth Circuit held that a court may not impose a statutory mandatory minimum
without making a finding that "a particular defendant had some connection with the larger amount
on which the sentencing is based or that he could reasonably foresee that such an amount would be
involved in the transactions of which he was guilty." Banuelos, 322 F.3d at 704 (quoting United
States v. Becerra, 992 F.2d 960, 966-67 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1993)); United States v. Quiroz-Hemandez,
48 F.3d 858, 870 (5th Cir. 1995) (setting Ninth Circuit precedent in regards to this issue).
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant who participates in a drug conspiracy is
accountable for the quantity of drugs, which is attributable to the conspiracy and
reasonably foreseeable to him. "Reasonable foreseeability does not follow automatically
from proof that [the defendant] was a member of the conspiracy." Reasonable
foreseeability requires a finding separate from a finding that the defendant was a
conspirator.
Quiroz-Hernandez,48 F.3d at 870 (citations omitted).
38 See Stoddard, 892 F.3d at 1221 (highlighting importance of foreseeability for each
individual co-conspirator); United States v. Puma, 937 F.2d 151, 160 (5th Cir. 1991) (rejecting
government's argument that defendant must have reasonably foreseen quantity of drugs in
conspiracy); but see Pizarro, 772 F.3d at 290 (opining government properly conceded error
occurred in regards to sentencing).
39 See United States v. Phillips, 349 F.3d 138, 142 (3d Cir. 2003), vacated on other grounds,
Barbour v. United States, 543 U.S. 1102 (2005) (holding that "Apprendi does not require a jury to
make defendant-specific determinations of drug type and quantity in conspiracy cases."). "The
finding of drug quantity for purposes of determining the statutory maximum is, in other words, to
be an offense-specific, not a defendant-specific, determination." Id. at 143. See United States v.
Knight, 342 F.3d 697, 711-12 (7th Cir. 2003) (conforming to conspiracy-wide approach).
"Apprendi... does not require defendant-specific findings of drug type and quantity in drugconspiracy cases." Id. at 710.
40 See Phillips, 349 F.3d at 143 (listing requirements to sentence defendant on drug conspiracy
charge); Knight, 342 F.3d at 712 (identifying what jury must determine beyond reasonable doubt).
"[T]he jury [must determine] whether each defendant was guilty of participating in the conspiracy
and then [must determine] that the conspiracy involved a type and quantity of drugs sufficient to
trigger the statutory maximum .. " Knight, 342 F.3d at 712.
41 See United States v. Miller, 645 F. App'x 211, 218 (3d Cir. 2016) (finding Alleyne error
harmless where "jury did not determine [a drug quantity] directly attributable" to individual
defendant); United States v. Cruse, 805 F.3d 795, 817 (7th Cir. 2015) (contradicting Seventh
Circuit's conspiracy-wide position, though not on Alleyne grounds).
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approach, they certainly seem to struggle with its application in the wake of
42
Alleyne, and may have abandoned the approach in practice.
Both the Sixth and Tenth Circuits have openly questioned their
application of the conspiracy-wide approach following the Alleyne
determination. 43 The Sixth Circuit appeared to adopt the conspiracy-wide
approach in Robinson, but later questioned whether it was consistent with
constitutional principles in both Young and Gibson, reluctantly applying the
The Tenth Circuit, which explicitly
traditional conspiracy-wide test."
adopted the conspiracy-wide approach in Stiger, shifted after Alleyne and
determined in Ellis that it was error for the defendant to be sentenced
according to a mandatory minimum where the jury did not find the amount
45
of drugs individually attributable to him.

The jury was told that Cruse and McClain were responsible for "the amount of cocaine
involved in the agreement, and all amounts involved in all acts of the coconspirators
committed in furtherance of the conspiracy." This instruction omitted the Pinkerton
principle that coconspirator liability only extends to those criminal acts that (1) were
reasonably foreseeable to the defendants; and (2) occurred during the time that they were
members of the conspiracy .... Everyone agrees that the jury should have been
instructed on the Pinkerton doctrine.
Cruse, 805 F.3d at 817.
42 See Miller, 645 Fed. App'x at 218 ("This lack of an individualized determination.., was
error in light ofAlleyne .... However, such a lapse was harmless.").
43 See United States v. Robinson, 547 F.3d 632, 639 (6th Cir. 2008) ("Here, the 'fact' that
increases the default penalty for a conspiracy to distribute drugs is the quantity of drugs involved
in the conspiracy."); but see United States v. Young, 847 F.3d 328, 367 (6th Cir. 2017) (stating
"regardless of which approach we apply to [defendant's] sentence, the outcome is the same.");
United States v. Gibson, No. 15-6122, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 21141, at *1-2 (6th Cir. Nov. 21,
2016) (utilizing conspiracy-wide approach), vacated, 854 F.3d 367 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc);
United States v. Gibson, 874 F.3d 544 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (addressing case amongst full
circuit, ultimately dividing equally and reinstating conspiracy-wide approach utilized in trial court);
see also United States v. Stiger, 413 F.3d 1185, 1193 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding "[t]he jury is not
required to make individualized findings as to each coconspirator because the sentencing judge's
findings do not, because they cannot, have the effect of increasing an individual defendant's
sentencing exposure beyond the statutory maximum justified by the jury's guilty verdict."). The
10th Circuit later held that the district court committed the Alleyne of error convicting defendant
"without the jury's having found his individually attributable amount of cocaine .. " United States
v. Ellis, 868 F.3d 1155, 1170 (10th Cir. 2017).
44 See Young, 847 F.3d at 367 (avoiding choice between individualized approach and
conspiracy-wide approach). "[T]here is no need for us to reconcile these cases at this time." 1d;
Gibson, 874 F.3d at 544 (announcing even divide amongst en banc circuit). Because the judges of
the Sixth Circuit were unable to come to an agreement on what method to use, the sentence imposed
by the district court was affirmed, where the district court stated that "[b]ecause Gibson pleaded
guilty to conspiring to distribute methamphetamine, and admitted that the conspiracy 'involved' 50
grams or more of methamphetamine, the drug conspiracy statute exposes him to the crime of
distributing 50 grams of more ofmethamphetamine, together with its ten-year mandatory minimum
sentence." Gibson, 2016 LEXIS 21141, at *2.
41 See Ellis, 868 F.3d at 1177 (announcing Alleyne directly overruled Stiger "on one point").
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IV. ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court has not addressed the constitutionality of
sentencing a defendant to a mandatory minimum sentence based off a drug
quantity attributable to the conspiracy he or she was involved in without
conclusively determining that the defendant should have reasonably foreseen
the quantity of drugs.46 In order to determine whether the Supreme Court
has implied through Alleyne that sentencing a defendant based on a
conspiracy-wide quantity of drugs is in fact unconstitutional, the holding and
reasoning of the Court must be examined thoroughly, as it holds tremendous
importance in the understanding of this realm of the law.47 According to the
Court in Alleyne, "[t]he touchstone for determining whether a fact must be
found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt is whether the fact constitutes an
'element' or 'ingredient' of the charged offense." 48 All of the circuits agree

In a reversal of fortune, Stiger's conspiracy-wide maximum sentence is now limited by
the mandatory-minimum sentence's statutory range. For example, if a defendant's
individually attributable amount of crack cocaine is 100 grams, that compels a statutory
sentencing range of 5 to 40 years, under § 841(b)(1)(B). And even if the conspiracywide crack-cocaine amount far exceeds 280 grams, the maximum cannot rise past 40
years without creating a new sentencing range of 5 years to life. Nothing in 841(b)
suggests that Congress intended us to merge its precise statutory sentencing ranges in
this fashion.
Id. at 1178.
46 See United States v. Stoddard, 892 F.3d 1203, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (noting indecision on
issue of individualized versus conspiracy-wide sentencing method).
The question remains "whether it is the individualized drug quantity that is a fact that
increases the mandatory minimum sentence.., or whether, as the District Court found,
the amount of drugs attributable to the conspiracy as a whole can be the fact which
triggers the mandatory minimum for an individual defendant."
Id. (quoting United States v. Pizarro, 772 F.3d 284, 292 (1st Cir. 2014)).
47 See id. at 1220 (recognizing courts' reliance on Alleyne in declaring conspiracy-wide
approach unconstitutional).
Although some circuits have used the conspiracy-wide approach, it has been called into
question by Alleyne and subsequent cases from those circuits. Notably, the circuits to
adopt the conspiracy-wide approach did so before Alleyne was decided in 2013, while
all circuits to explicitly address the issue in Alleyne's wake have adopted or followed the
individualized approach. The circuits that earlier adopted the conspiracy-wide approach
have, at times, failed to grapple with it in subsequent published and unpublished cases
decided after Alleyne.
Id.
48 See Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 107 (2013) (defining which facts constitute an
element of offense). Applying Apprendi's reasoning to mandatory minimum offenses, Alleyne
specifies that elements include "not only facts that increase the ceiling, but also those that increase
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that the quantity of drugs that a defendant is held accountable for is an
element of the offense and therefore must be charged to the jury and proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.4 9 The disagreement among the circuits stems
from the confusion over which particular approach to use in sentencing a
defendant in a conspiracy drug case.5 °
A. Principles Outlined in Alleyne Show Supportfor Individualized
Approach
The principles set out in Alleyne coincide quite conclusively with the

individualized approach.5 ' The Alleyne Court's reasoning that the "linkage
of facts with particular sentence ranges ...

reflects the intimate connection

between crime and punishment" demonstrates why the individualized
approach is much more suited to the nation's constitutional values.5 2 In order

the floor... [because both] alter the prescribed range of sentences to which a defendant is exposed
and do so in a manner that aggravates the punishment." Id. at 108.
49 See Stoddard, 892 F.3d at 1219 (noting requirement of jury determination for mandatoryminimum drug quantity); Haines, 803 F.3d at 738 ("Because the quantity of heroin involved affects
[defendants'] minimum sentences under § 841, it must be found by a jury."); United States v.
Rangel, 781 F.3d 736, 743 (4th Cir. 2015) (considering quantity of drugs element that must be
proven to jury); Pizarro,772 F.3d at 293 ("In a drug conspiracy... conviction with a mandatory
minimum and statutory maximum based on drug quantity, the jury must find those requisite drug
quantities."); United States v. Robinson, 547 F.3d 632, 639 (6th Cir. 2008) (acknowledging in
conspiracy-wide jurisdiction drug quantity must be proven to jury); United States v. Banuelos, 322
F.3d 700, 704-05 (9th Cir. 2005) (recognizing drug quantity must be proven to jury beyond
reasonable doubt); United States v. Knight, 342 F.3d 697, 710 (7th Cir. 2003) ("[D]efendants may
be subject to a statutorily enhanced sentence based on drug type and quantity, as provided in §
841(b), only if those facts are charged in the indictment and proven to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.").
5o See United States v. Young, 847 F.3d 328, 367 (6th Cir. 2017) (avoiding decision of which
approach to use). "[R]egardless of which approach we apply to [the defendant's] sentence, the
outcome is the same. Thus, there is no need for us to reconcile these cases at this time." Id.; Gibson,
874 F.3d at 544 (affirming lower court's use of conspiracy-wide approach after even divide
amongst en banc circuit). But see Stoddard,892 F.3d at 1222 ("[T]he Alleyne/Burrage paradigm
supports our conclusion that the individualized approach to determining a mandatory-minimumtriggering drug quantity is correct."); Banuelos, 322 F.3d at 704 (holding steadfast to accuracy of
individualized approach).
51 See Stoddard, 892 F.3d at 1222 (explaining Alleyne's support of individualized approach).
"Alleyne sets up this paradigm... conspiring to violate § 841(a)(1) is a 'lesser-included offense'
of conspiring to violate § 841(a)(1) when the drug quantity meets a threshold that triggers an
enhanced sentence." Id; see United States v. Haines, 803 F.3d 713, 741 (5th Cir. 2015) ("Apprendi
and Alleyne require the jury... to determine the amount which each defendant knew or should
have known was involved in the conspiracy" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
52 See Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 109 (trumpeting consistency of Court's holding with ancient
principles of justice). "Consistent with this connection between crime and punishment, various
treatises defined crime as consisting of every fact which is in law essential to the punishment sought
to be inflicted." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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to preserve this "intimate connection," a defendant's punishment should
directly correlate with the infraction that he or she committed.5 3 The
connection between crime and punishment is ruptured when a defendant is
punished based on a quantity of drugs that he or she could not have
reasonably foreseen. 4 A penalty imposed evenly on each member of a
conspiracy without regard to that person's own level of involvement casts a
shadow on the justice system's principle of the "intimate connection between
crime and punishment," subjecting a defendant to a disproportionately
severe penalty for criminal conduct that he or she personally may not have
committed.5 5
B. Government's Willingness to Comply with the Individualized
Approach
The individualized approach to drug conspiracy sentencing is
strongly bolstered by the government's willingness to comply with this
approach.56 In the government's brief to the Fifth Circuit in Haines, the

" See Stoddard,892 F.3d at 1221 (describing importance of holding one liable only for things
"reasonably foreseeable" to him). "It is a core principle of conspiratorial liability that a coconspirator may be held liable for acts committed by co-conspirators during the course of the
conspiracy only when those acts are 'in furtherance of the conspiracy' and 'reasonably
foresee[able]' to the defendant." Id. (quoting Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647-48
(1946)); Haines, 803 F.3d at 741 (emphasizing importance of personal wrongdoing). "[A]n
individual convicted of conspiring to distribute at least 1,000 kilograms of marijuana... is not
necessarily subject to the ten-year minimum. Only if the defendant is responsible for at least 1,000
kilograms ... does the mandatory statutory minimum apply." Haines, 803 F.3d at 741 (quoting
United States v. Gurrusquieta, No. 01-11034, 2002 WL 31730264, at *3 (5th Cir. Nov. 21, 2002)).
54 See Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 113 (opining about connection between punishment and
wrongdoing). "Why else would Congress link an increased mandatory minimum to a particular
aggravating fact other than to heighten the consequences for that behavior?" Id; Pizarro,772 F.3d
at 292 (describing longstanding custom of individualized method).
55 See Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 108 (recognizing importance of proving wrongdoing to jury). The
importance that the Supreme Court places on proving every element of a crime to the jury that has
the potential to increase a mandatory minimum sentence demonstrates the retributivist principle of
the American criminal justice system to punish an individual only for the crimes that the
government can prove he personally committed. 1d; see Stoddard, 892 F.3d at 1220 (noting
defendants' exposure to significantly higher sentence if conspiracy-wide method is utilized);
Hansler, supranote 3, at 2 (highlighting devastating effect of conspiracy-wide sentencing for Alice
Johnson). "Johnson was sentenced to life in federal prison without parole in 1996 after being
convicted on charges of conspiracy to possess cocaine, attempted possession of cocaine, and money
laundering." Hansler,supra note 3, at 2.
56 See Stoddard, 892 F.3d at 1222 (showcasing government's general support for
individualized approach); Haines, 803 F.3d at 738 (demonstrating government's agreement with
defendants on use of individualized approach to calculate sentence).
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government not only consented to using the individualized approach, but
urged it.57
In its brief, the government agrees with the defendants that
"at least [as] to imposing a mandatory minimum, ... the
sentence should be based on a defendant-specific
approach-a finding as to the type and quantity of drugs that
can be attributed to the individual defendant by his personal
conduct and reasonable-foreseeability of co-conspirator
conduct."5 8
In the D.C. Circuit, the government has also demonstrated its
preference for the individualized approach.59 "The Government's general
charging and motions practices offer further evidence that the criminal
justice system is moving toward the individualized approach," as the court
notes that "the Government's argument for the conspiracy-wide approach
here appears to be a one-case wonder."6 °
Even in the Sixth Circuit, which has continued to utilize the
conspiracy-wide approach, the government has urged the courts to
reconsider, tending to charge defendants using the individualized approach. 6

57 See Haines, 803 F.3d at 742 (depicting government's support).
58

See id.(explaining government's position).
At the time of sentencing, the government advocated [that] both mandatory minimums
and statutory maximums were controlled by the jury's conspiracy-wide finding. After
defendants were sentenced, the Department of Justice shifted its policy, urging that
mandatory minimum sentences in drug conspiracy cases should be determined by a
jury's defendant-specific finding, in light of Alleyne.

Id. But see id.(recognizing government's inconsistent reasoning at trial).
However, at oral argument the government cautioned that the rule for drug quantity
findings that increase the mandatory minimum should be the same as the rule for
[those] ...that increase the statutory maximum-and the government suggests that our
precedent... requires a finding as to the conspiracy-wide quantity for purposes of the
statutory maximum.
Id.
19 See Stoddard, 892 F.3d at 1222 (discussing government's charging practices).
60 See id (noting government's inability to show other cases where it argues for adoption of
conspiracy-wide approach). "At oral argument, the Government could not safely say that there are
any other cases in this Circuit in which it is currently arguing for a court to adopt the conspiracywide approach." Id
61 See United States v. Young, 847 F.3d 328, 366 & n. 3 (6th Cir. 2017) (addressing
government's contention that court is inconsistent in application of conspiracy-wide approach).
"The government asserts that we have been inconsistent in addressing whether mandatory
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In Young, the government contended that the court's precedent is unclear, as
it decided one case using the individualized approach, another using the
conspiracy-wide approach, and later attempted to reconcile the two by
utilizing language from both approaches.62 The Sixth Circuit avoided
confronting this accusation by stating in its opinion, "there is no need for us
to reconcile these cases at this time. "63
C. ClearLack of Supportfor Conspiracy-Wide Approach Nationwide
The conspiracy-wide approach has a clear lack of support across the
nation-nothing demonstrates this point better than to examine circuits that
have once fought for the approach shift their position or toil in an uninspired
64 The Sixth Circuit, up until this point, still expressly
manner to champion it.
utilizes the conspiracy-wide approach. In the Sixth Circuit, admission or
conviction of a conspiracy involving a certain quantity of drugs "triggers the
mandatory-minimum sentence in [this] circuit, regardless of whether [the

minimum sentences for § 846 drug conspiracy offenses are determined by conspiracy-wide or
defendant-specific drug quantities." Id.
62 See id. at 366 (explaining government's contention).
The government contends that Robinson is inconsistent with United States v. Swiney,
203 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 2000), because Swiney held that an individualized approach, as
articulated in the Sentencing Guidelines, determines the statutory range, whereas
Robinson holds that a conspiracy-wide drug quantity determines the statutory penalty
range. The government also asserts that our decision in United States v. Watson, 620 F.
App'x 493, 509 (6th Cir. 2015) incorrectly reconciled Robinson and Swiney... [as
defendants] were sentenced to mandatory minimums due to the quantity of drugs
attributable to the individual defendants and all reasonably foreseeable quantities of
contraband that were within the scope of the conspiracy.
Id.

63 See id. at 362 (avoiding rejection of either approach).

64 See Stoddard, 892 F.3d at 1220 (recognizing struggle of several circuits to grapple with
conspiracy-wide approach). "We are also persuaded by the decisions of our sister circuits that have
adopted the individualized approach. Those opinions buttress our conclusion here." Id.at 1222.
65 See id.at 1220 (noting Sixth Circuit's hesitant reinstatement of sentence based on
conspiracy-wide ruling); United States v. Gibson, 874 F.3d 544, 544 (6th Cir. 2017) (dividing
equally amongst full panel causing reinstatement of lower court sentence). "The en banc court is
evenly divided; therefore, the sentence imposed by the district court is AFFIRMED." Id See
United States v. Gibson, No. 15-6122, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 21141, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 21, 2016)
(supporting conspiracy-wide approach). "While [the defendant] did not further admit that he
reasonably foresaw that the conspiracy would involve that drug quantity, he did not need to. In
Robinson... [we] 'interpreted 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) to focus on the threshold quantity involved
in the entire conspiracy."' Id.at *2 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 547 F.3d 632, 638 (6th
Cir. 2008)).
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defendant] could reasonably foresee the drug quantity."66 The Sixth Circuit
relied on its precedent, and declined to join the other circuits in
acknowledging the more preferable individualized approach, articulating
likely the strongest argument one could make against Alleyne requirement of
the conspiracy-wide approach in Gibson.67 The court stated:
"Alleyne did not rewrite § 841(b) to add a new mens rea
requirement."... [The defendant] also asserts that United
States v. Swiney, 203 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 2000), holds that
there is a mens rea requirement on the drug-quantity
element, and argues that that case must be followed as the
prior published opinion. This court has already rejected that
argument too. "[Swiney]- which stated 'that Pinkerton
principles ...

determine whether a defendant convicted

under 21 U.S.C. § 846 is subject to the penalty [for the
addict's death as] set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C)'
concerns sentencing under the Guidelines," and sets out a
"different standard" from "the standard applicable to the
68
drug quantity finding."
This reasoning is anything but clear, but it is the only justification to
stand against Alleyne requiring the individualized approach: that it goes
against case precedent and is not explicitly mandated by the Supreme
Court.69
At the end of Gibson, even Circuit Judge John M. Rogers
acknowledged the lack of support for the opinion and use of the conspiracywide approach.7"
The result in this case may appear unjust. Mandatory
minimums for limited-amount co-conspirators do not serve
the drug statute's underlying purpose of more severely
punishing larger amount drug dealers. Nonetheless, absent

66 See Gibson, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 21141, at *3 (excerpting circuit's position on reasonable
foreseeability).
67 See id.(dismissing defendant's argument that Alleyne requires use of individualized
approach). "[The defendant] contends on appeal, though, that he was involved in only three meth
sales, and that Alleyne... turned the drug quantity into an element of a drug conspiracy that must
be found by the jury. This court has already rejected this argument .. " Id.
68 See id.(quoting United States v. Dado, 759 F.3d 550, 570 (6th Cir. 2014), and United States
v. Watson, 620 F. App'x 493, 509 (6th Cir. 2015)) (reasoning Alleyne does not forbid conspiracywide approach).

69 See id.
at *4 (commenting on harsh result of case).
70 See id.
(explaining Judge Roger's reasoning for what appears to be unfair outcome).
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a change in our law from the en banc court, the Supreme
Court, or Congress, we are bound by our precedents.7 1
Following the appeal of this case to the en banc court, there was an
even split among the circuit judges, and the conspiracy-wide approach was
72

reinstated.

In the Third Circuit, the conspiracy-wide approach, while not being
explicitly overruled by the court, was impliedly rejected. 73 In Miller, in order
to find the defendant guilty of conspiracy, the jury was instructed by the
district court that they must "unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt
that the weight or quantity of cocaine.., involved in the conspiracy was five
kilograms or more." 74 Both the government and the defendant submitted to
the court that this conspiracy-wide determination at the point of sentencing
was constitutional error in light of the Court's holding in Alleyne. 75 The
Third Circuit specified that it "agree[d]" with both of the parties regarding
the Alleyne error, but in reviewing for harmlessness the court concluded that
the defendant was charged with a drug quantity easily attributable to the his
responsibility in the conspiracy, determining that it was a pure sentencing
error that was harmless to the integrity of the conviction.76
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit, a formerly avid supporter of the
conspiracy-wide theory, has contradicted its conspiracy-wide position,

71 See Gibson, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 21141, at *4 (exposing appeals judges' limited ability
to change law absent binding precedent). Judge Rogers's opinion in Gibson demonstrates the lack
of enthusiasm for the use of the conspiracy-wide approach and the urgency for the Supreme Court
to comment on the constitutionality of the conspiracy-wide approach in light ofAlleyne. Id.
72 See Gibson, 874 F.3d at 544 (announcing court was unable to come to decision on which
approach to adopt).
73 See United States v. Miller, 645 Fed. App'x 211, 217 (3d Cir. 2016) (portraying importance
of Supreme Court's holding in Alleyne).
74 See id. (instructing jury to utilize conspiracy-wide approach). "In finding [the defendant]
guilty of conspiracy, the jury unanimously determined that the conspiracy involved five or more
kilograms of cocaine ....But, as [the defendant] submits, and the Government concedes, the jury
did not determine an exact amount of cocaine and cocaine base directly attributable to [the
defendant] himself." Id.at 217-18.
75 See id.at 218 (demonstrating consensus among parties to case). "This lack of an
individualized determination, the parties maintain, was error in light ofAlleyne." Id.
76 See id.
at 218-20 (qualifying court's decision to proscribe harmless error analysis).
[W]hile the Supreme Court had not discussed such a review in Alleyne, the Court has
"... adopted the general rule that a constitutional error does not automatically require a
reversal of a conviction," and that the Supreme Court has "applied harmless error
analysis to a wide range of errors and has recognized that most constitutional errors can
be harmless."
Id. at 218 (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991)).
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though on grounds other than Alleyne.7 7 The defendants in Cruse raised a
claim on appeal of instructional error in their sentencing process, due to the
special verdict form instructing the jury based on the conspiracy-wide
approach. v8 In finding error here, the court relied on the Pinkerton principle

that "coconspirator liability only extends to those criminal acts that (1) were
reasonably foreseeable to the defendants; and (2) occurred during the time
that they were members of the conspiracy."79 Although not relying on
Alleyne in finding a constitutional violation in this case, the court abandoned

the conspiracy-wide approach nonetheless, implicitly, if not explicitly."
In August 2017, the Tenth Circuit, a conspiracy-wide circuit before
the Supreme Court's decision in Alleyne, reevaluated their policy regarding
sentencing requirements for mandatory minimum triggering drug conspiracy
cases." In Ellis, the Tenth Circuit expressly adopted and demanded that the
government prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt the quantity of drugs
personally attributable to the defendant.8

2

The court recognized that in order

for the defendant to have preserved an "Alleyne objection," he would have
to object at the sentencing phase of the trial.83 The court determined that the

77 See United States v. Cruse, 805 F.3d 795, 817 (7th Cir. 2015) (pointing to Pinkerton
principle).
78 See id (addressing defendants' points of appeal). The jury was instructed that the
defendants were responsible for "the amount of cocaine involved in the agreement, and all amounts
involved in all acts of the coconspirators committed in furtherance of the conspiracy." Id.
79 See id. (citing Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1946)).
80 See id.(noting jury should have been instructed on such constitutional principles).
"Everyone agrees that the jury should have been instructed on the Pinkerton doctrine." Id.
(emphasis added).
81 See United States v. Ellis, 868 F.3d 1155, 1174-75 (10th Cir. 2017) (clarifying confusion
surrounding which approach to use).
[T]o succeed on his Alleyne argument, [the defendant] must still show that individually
attributable cocaine amounts are an element of the cocaine-conspiracy charge. On this
point, the government asserts that "this Court has not issued a published decision [after
Alleyne] expressly stating what determination the jury must make when a defendant is
charged with an offense that carries a statutory mandatory-minimum penalty"... the
district court committed Alleyne error by convicting and sentencing [the defendant] on
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) without the jury's having found his individually attributable
amount of cocaine as at least [the amount triggering the mandatory minimum].
Id.
82 See id. (dismissing government's position that court had not demanded individualized
approach before). "In [Dewberry], decided two years after Alleyne, we said that, because 280 grams
of crack cocaine would increase the statutory mandatory-minimum sentence, that drug amount 'was
an element of the offense and had to be proved at trial."' Id.(quoting United States v. Dewberry,
790 F.3d 1022, 1029 (10th Cir. 2015)).
83 See id at 1171 (determining standard to use to assess Alleyne error).

2020]

ONE SHOULD NOT PAY FOR ALL

defendant himself did object to the sentence that was imposed on him,
appearing pro se at the sentencing hearing:
I don't understand why I'm here today. And for the jury to
find me guilty, I didn't understand because there was no
amount... the jury transcripts, it was no amount to say if I
was guilty of 280 grams. I mean, even the videos that I was
in does not show me specifically with crack cocaine in
84
possession selling to no one.
Further, as previously mentioned, the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and
D.C. Circuits have openly supported and urged courts to use the
individualized approach since Alleyne was decided.8 5 Not only have these
circuits expressly endorsed the use of the individualized approach after
Alleyne, but they have employed this approach before Alleyne was even
decided.86 For example, in Stoddard, the D.C. Circuit recognized that the
law in that circuit implicitly required the individualized method since 2008. 87
Similarly, in Banuelos, the Ninth Circuit commented that the court has been
using the individualized approach since 1993.88 In Pizarro,the First Circuit
recognized that it had been using the individualized approach for sentencing

84 See id (excerpting defendant's pro se objection). "And I was never shown to be convicted
by the jury by a certain drug amount because 280 grams, there's never no evidence, to my
knowledge, that's being brought up." Id. (citations omitted).
85 See United States v. Stoddard, 892 F.3d 1203, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (adopting
individualized approach to drug-quantity determinations triggering individual defendant's
mandatory-minimum sentence); United States v. Haines, 803 F.3d 713,739 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding
that defendants' should have been sentenced based on individualized method); United States v.
Rangel, 781 F.3d 736, 744 (4th Cir. 2015) (applying individualized principle that defendant must
be personally responsible for drug quantity); United States v. Pizarro, 772 F.3d 284, 293-94 (1st
Cir. 2014) (conforming to individualized sentencing method); United States v. Banuelos, 322 F.3d
700, 704 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing and remanding case where district court sentenced defendant
based on conspiracy-wide quantity).
86 See Stoddard, 892 F.3d at 1222 (exposing D.C. Circuit preference for individualized
method); Haines, 803 F.3d at 741 (affirming individualized approach has been longstanding rule);
Rangel, 781 F.3d at 742 (noting Collins requirement of individualized sentencing); Pizarro, 772
F.3d at 292 (articulating use of individualized approach before Alleyne); Banuelos, 322 F.3d at 704
(citing numerous cases before Alleyne requiring individualized approach).
87 See Stoddard,892 F.3d at 1221 (recognizing holding in United States v. Law, 528 F.3d 888
(D.C. Cir. 2008). "[W]e held [in Law] that 'a defendant convicted of conspiracy to deal drugs, in
violation of § 846, must be sentenced, under § 841(b), for the quantity of drugs the jury attributes
to him as a reasonablyforeseeablepart of the conspiracy."' Id. (citing Law, 528 F.3d at 906).
88 See Banuelos, 322 F.3d at 704 (reaffirming longstanding use of individualized approach).
"[The] court may not impose statutory mandatory minimum without finding that 'a particular
defendant had some connection with the larger amount on which the sentencing is based or that he
could reasonably foresee that such an amount would be involved in the transactions of which he
was guilty."' Id. (quoting United States v. Becerra, 992 F.2d 960, 966-67 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1993)).
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before Alleyne was decided, in 2004.89 In Rangel, the Fourth Circuit pointed

to precedent from 2005 requiring that the government prove individualized
90
quantities of drugs attributable to defendants involved in conspiracy cases.
Likewise, in Haines, the Fifth Circuit recognized that it found error in the

past, dating back to 2002, where district courts based a statutory minimum
91
The longstanding use
in reliance on conspiracy-wide quantities of drugs.
tends to support the
circuits
of
the
of the individualized method by a number

argument that the use of the conspiracy-wide method is unconstitutional,

92
particularly in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Alleyne.

D. Public Opinion Regarding DrugPolicy Tends to Favor Use of
IndividualizedApproach

In general, citizens of the United States are already acrimonious and
resentful of mandatory-minimum sentencing for drug offenders responsible
for a bush-league quantity of drugs.93 An organization entitled Families

89 See Pizarro,772 F.3d at 292 (citing precedent utilizing individualized approach). "We have
already answered that question in United States v. Col6n-Solis, 354 F.3d 101 (1st Cir. 2004), where
we held that a mandatory minimum... 'cannot be applied in [a particular coconspirator's] case
without an individualized finding that the triggering amount was attributable to, or foreseeable by,
him."' Id. (quoting Coln-Solis, 354 F.3d at 103).
90 See Rangel, 781 F.3d at 742 (recalling case precedent requiring individualized approach).
In [Collins], we considered on direct appeal the district court's failure to give an
instruction 'that, for purposes of setting a specific threshold drug quantity under §
841(b), the jury must determine what amount of cocaine base was attributable to [a drug
conspiracy defendant]' ... the failure to give such instruction was error ....
Id. (quoting Collins, 415 F.3d at 314).
91 See Haines, 803 F.3d at 741 (offering case precedent supporting individualized method).
In Gurrusquieta,we noted that a defendant's conviction for conspiring to distribute in
excess of 1,000 kilograms of marijuana did not automatically trigger the 10-year
mandatory minimum because "a defendant is only accountable for all quantities of the
marijuana with which he was directly involved, and all reasonably foreseeable quantities
of marijuana that were within the scope of the criminal activity that he jointly
undertook... In other words, an individual convicted of conspiring to distribute at least
1,000 kilograms of marijuana... is not necessarily subject to the ten-year minimum.
Only if the defendant is responsible for at least 1,000 kilograms, as determined by the
Sentencing Guidelines, does the mandatory statutory minimum apply."
Id. (citing United States v. Gurrusquieta, No. 01-11034, 2002 WL 31730264, at *3 (5th Cir. Nov.
21, 2002)).
92 See United States v. Stoddard, 892 F.3d 1203, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (noting general
acceptance amongst federal courts of individualized approach).
93 See Bjerk, supra note 6, at 93 (outlining American hostility of 21 U.S.C. § 841 provision of
mandatory minimums).
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Against Mandatory Minimums (FAMM) echoes the position of a large
number of the American population in demonstrating why mandatory
minimums are so strongly disliked, detailing the stories of its members.9 4
When Sessions made the call to sentence defendants charged with drug
offenses with "the most serious, readily provable offense," the country
responded in outcry. 95 Eric Holder commented on Sessions decision as an
"absurd reversal... driven by voices who have not only been discredited but
until now have been relegated to the fringes of this debate., 96 Reasons
behind the severe public dislike of mandatory minimum sentencing for drug
crimes have included uncontrollably large prison populations,
disproportionate effect on minorities, and high costs to taxpayers. 97 "States
that have relied on treatment and rehabilitation programs over imprisonment
for low-level drug crimes have seen success ...Texas... saved $2 billion
by shutting down prisons no longer needed." 98

On its website, Families Against Mandatory Minimums [FAMM] includes a number of
facts, highlighting the boom in prison populations, prison costs, and the high number of
drug offenders serving long prison terms, with the implication being that the mandatory
minimums for drug offenders are a primary contributor to these facts and trends ...
being convicted of trafficking a drug quantity just in excess of a mandatory-minimumeligibility threshold is associated with a significant increase in expected sentence length
for powder cocaine, methamphetamine, marijuana, and heroin offenders ....
Id. at 94-95 (noting this is not case for crack cocaine offenders).
94 See Cynthia Powell: 25 Yearsfor 35 Pills,supra note 7 ("FAMM's greatest asset has always
been the stories of its members. By sharing the impact of unjust sentencing and prison policies on
incarcerated individuals, their families, and their communities, FAMM has helped create urgency

around the issue ....
").
9' See Editorial,supra note 3 (demonstrating public loathing of mandatory minimum sentences
for nonviolent drug offenders).
96 See Ford, supra note 3 (noting Holder's distaste and lack of support for strict mandatory

minimums).
97 See Editorial, supra note 3 (demonstrating why Americans dislike mandatory minimum
sentences). "Mandatory minimum sentences that prevailed through the 1980s and 1990s filled
federal prisons with low-level offenders, at great expense to taxpayers and to the country's black
and Hispanic communities. Cities, meanwhile, did not get safer." Id.; see also Ford, supra note 3
("The policy announced today is not tough on crime ....It is dumb on crime. It is an ideologically
motivated, cookie-cutter approach that has only been proven to generate unfairly long sentences
that are often applied indiscriminately and do little to achieve long-term public safety."); Hansler,
supra note 3 (commenting on long prison sentences as result of mandatory minimums).
The [US Sentencing Commission] found that those convicted in the 2016 fiscal year of
crimes carrying mandatory minimum penalties received an average of 110 monthsapproximately nine years-in prison. That was four times the average sentence-a bit
over two years-for those convicted of a crime without the mandatory minimum.
Hansler, supra note 3.
98 See Editorial, supranote 3 (presenting example benefit of cutting back number of defendants
sentenced to mandatory minimum offenses). "The cost of the federal prison system has reached $7
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If all the circuits were to adopt the individualized approach, the harsh
effect of mandatory minimum sentencing would be slightly muted. 99
Although this approach does not get rid of mandatory minimum sentences
altogether, it ensures that every defendant will be sentenced in direct
accordance with his individual level of blameworthiness."' This would
naturally cut down on the prison population and save taxpayer money. 101
While not a perfect solution, compliance with the constitutional requirement
of Alleyne would necessarily limit the mandate on federal prosecutors across
the country in preventing defendants from being sentenced to a
disproportionately lengthy mandatory minimum as a result of the
unforeseeable actions of other members of the conspiracy that he or she was
10 2
involved in.
V. CONCLUSION
When a defendant is charged with a conspiracy drug crime, he or she
is exposed to a lengthy mandatory minimum sentence that will be
inescapable if found guilty. As a result of the high risk of extensive prison
time, the government should be required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

billion, while housing a population that is nearly half drug offenders. But instead of beefing up drug
use treatment programs, the Trump administration has proposed cutting funding for them." Id.
99 See United States v. Stoddard, 892 F.3d 1203, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (vacating defendants'
convictions while noting severe mandatory minimum as result of conspiracy-wide method).
The District Court's error was not harmless here because the evidence was far from
overwhelming with respect to the quantity of heroin involved in the conspiracy that was
reasonably foreseeable to [the defendants]. Had the jury been properly instructed and
given a proper verdict form, the outcome may well have been different.
Id.
100 See id. (emphasizing importance on sentence reflecting individual liability). "[We] remand
to the District Court with instructions to re-sentence each Appellant based on the crime for which
the jury found each one of them individually liable .... " Id.
101 See United States v. Haines, 803 F.3d 713, 740 (5th Cir. 2015) (detailing individualized
process that would limit sentence length). "Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant who
participates in a drug conspiracy is accountable for the quantity of drugs, which is attributable to
the conspiracy and reasonably foreseeable to him. Reasonable foreseeability does not follow
automatically from proof that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy." Id. (citing United
States v. Quiroz-Hemandez, 48 F.3d 858, 870 (5th Cir. 1995)) (quotation marks omitted); see
Editorial, supra note 3 ("Harsh and inflexible sentencing policies have proved counterproductive
in the fight against illegal drugs. The focus should be on prosecuting the traffickers who rely on
violence to grow and protect their predatory enterprise.").
102 See United States v. Ellis, 868 F.3d 1155, 1170 (10th Cir. 2017) (limiting government to
individualized approach). "[T]he government asserts that this 'Court has not issued a published
decision... expressly stating what determination the jury must make when a defendant is charged
with an offense that carries a statutory mandatory-minimum penalty' .... But the government is
mistaken." Id. (citation omitted).
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that the defendant is culpable for the conspiracy that he is charged with
participating in. According to the First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth,
and D.C. Circuits, following the Supreme Court's ruling in Alleyne, proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of the offense charged requires
prosecutors to demonstrate that drug quantity involved in the conspiracy was
reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. The fact that the Sixth and Third
Circuits struggle to defend the conspiracy-wide approach demonstrates that
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires proof of this
"reasonable foreseeability" element to the jury when imposing a mandatory
minimum sentence on a defendant charged with a conspiracy drug offense.
If conspiracy-wide circuits' palpable conflict is not enough to require this
element of proof, public hostility towards mandatory minimum sentencing
and the sheer effect that it has on defendants across the country should
mandate the uniform adoption of the individualized approach.
HunterR. Wildrick

